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ABSTRACT 
Few policies have such far-reaching influence on an economy as exchange rate controls. 
Over the last decade, China has maintained an artificially devalued currency by 
purchasing U.S. dollars while selling domestic Renminbi (RMB). In theory, this practice 
will benefit the economy by making exports cheaper. Cheap exports have been an 
important component of the PRC’s investment-driven growth model, which transformed 
China into an economic powerhouse.  
Although a devalued currency makes exports cheaper, it also makes imports more 
expensive. As China’s economy evolves, the PRC recognizes the need to shift to a more 
innovative consumption-driven growth model from the current investment-driven model. 
This study argues that a devalued RMB is inhibiting this progress because it undermines 
the consumptive power of its citizens through more expensive imports, financial 
repression, and capital controls, all of which are closely linked to a devalued RMB. 
This study will look at imbalances in China’s consumption and production 
structures affected by a devalued RMB and identify the artificial “winners” and “losers” 
of the current policy. Also, gradual RMB appreciation over the last decade will be 
analyzed to determine the extent an increasing RMB has moved economic imbalances. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Currency devaluation is an exchange rate policy whereby governments artificially 
lower the value of their currency to increase the competitiveness of their exports. Critics 
in the United States (U.S.) argue that the Republic of China (PRC) utilizes this policy to 
gain an unfair trade advantage. With over a billion citizens, China, for decades, has 
pegged the Renminbi (RMB) to the U.S. dollar (USD) at an artificially low rate. A low 
valued currency relative to competing nations makes exports less expensive and imports 
more expensive, thereby providing advantages to specific sectors in the country with the 
lower valued currency. China has pursued this policy to develop an industrial capacity 
and to maintain low-end manufacturing jobs for its numerous citizens. Although a 
devalued currency makes exports cheaper, it also makes imports more expensive, which 
reduces citizen’s consumption power. Whether or not this tradeoff has a net gain or loss 
is immensely relevant to policy makers in both China and the United States. 
As one of America’s largest trading partners, China has the ability to impact the 
U.S. economy through its exchange rate polices. Actions that benefit certain sectors in its 
domestic economy can subsequently harm American competitors. Conversely, Chinese 
sectors harmed by these same policies may provide an advantage to certain U.S. sectors. 
General consensus in the United States appears to be against Beijing’s current policies, 
but could a currency adjustment actually be harmful to the American economy? Any 
discussion on China’s policies should also analyze the corresponding effects to sectors in 
the American economy. 
In its 12th five-year plan (FYP), the Communist Party of China (CCP) announced 
a plan to rebalance its economy from low-end manufacturing and investment to high-end 
manufacturing and services through domestic consumption. How will its current 
exchange rate policy affect this goal? This research seeks to examine the winners and 
losers of currency devaluation within the Chinese economy, as well as determine  
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implications for the American economy. More specifically, how does this policy affect 
China’s goal of greater consumer driven growth, and how will a policy shift affect the 
U.S. economy?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Currency manipulation is an issue that garners much international and domestic 
tension. China’s RMB value was a major focus of the 2012 U.S. presidential election. 
Business leaders and labor union officials, who are normally at odds, have been united 
against Beijing’s exchange rate policies. Legislators have put forth numerous bills aimed 
at curbing the currency misalignment.1 Scholars claim that an undervalued RMB is 
responsible for millions of lost U.S. jobs and is a driving factor of the enormous trade 
deficit with China.2 Trade officials from the United States and European Union have 
called for World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
action against China.3 Exchange rate policies affect, to varying degrees, all actors of the 
U.S. economy; therefore, it is of great importance to understand the implications of such 
policies. 
In China, the CCP realizes that economic progress is essential to political 
stability. At the heart of that stability is employment, and a rise in the value of the RMB 
could force export businesses to close, thereby increasing job loss. China’s economy 
relies on the profit of exports to drive investments in infrastructure and development. 
Leadership in Beijing, however, recognizes that China must rebalance its economy to 
allow for consumption driven growth in services and high-end manufacturing if it is to 
                                                 
1 Wayne Morrison and Marc Labonte, China’s Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues, CRS 
Report RS21625 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2010). 
2 Robert Scott, “The China Toll: Growing U.S. Trade Deficit with China Cost More Than 2.7 million 
Jobs Between 2001 and 2011, With Job Losses in Every State,” Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper 
#345, 2012; Paul Krugman, “Chinese New Year,” The New York Times, 2010. 
3 Kong Qingjiang, “China’s Currency Devaluation and WTO Issues,” China International Journal 
(2012): 110–118.  
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continue its rapid ascent.4 An understanding of how the current exchange rate policy 
impacts the different sectors of the economy is vital to continued growth.  
It appears to be overwhelmingly assumed that devaluation benefits the devaluing 
country. Despite enormous tension, many countries are moving toward increased 
devaluation. In recent years, the central banks of Japan and the United States have 
engaged in policies of currency devaluation. Although much attention is paid to the 
harmful effects of other countries’ devaluation, little attention is given to possible 
negative effects to the devaluing country. This research is important because it explores 
the negative effects of devaluation on China’s domestic economy. It seeks to identify 
sectors of the economy that may be harmed by devaluation, and to highlight many of the 
internal contradictions China faces in achieving its FYP. Mainly, is its current exchange 
rate policy aimed at helping exporters, and thus, undermining consumption driven 
growth? Also, if the RMB is revalued, could it actually harm the United States?  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The most important problem raised by the major research question is whether or 
not policies aimed at economic expansion actually achieve this end. Competitive 
devaluation creates artificial winners and losers. Much focus has been given to the 
artificial winners as evidenced by the number of countries that are devaluing their 
currency. This research focuses on the impact devaluation has on the artificial losers and 
how it affects the overall economy. More specifically, what sectors of the Chinese 
economy are hurt by devaluation and how does that affect the CCP’s intention to 
rebalance the country toward consumption driven growth. 
Also, political pressure in the United States appears to be against China’s current 
policies. A shift away from the status quo, however, will necessarily harm the sectors of 
the U.S. economy that have artificially benefited from a devalued RMB. This research  
 
                                                 
4 Il Houng Lee, Murtaza Syed, and Liu Xueyan, “China’s Path to Consumer-Based Growth: 
Reorienting Investment and Enhancing Efficiency,” International Monetary Fund, 2013, 3–22; British 
Chamber of Commerce in China, China-Britain Business Council, “12th Five Year Plan,” (n.d.), 
http://www.britishchamber.cn/content/chinas-twelfth-five-year-plan-2011-2015-full-english-version. 
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seeks to identify the sectors of the U.S. economy that will be harmed by an appreciated 
RMB, as well as determine the extent a policy shift will benefit or harm the U.S. 
economy overall. 
The preliminary conclusion is that China’s policy of currency devaluation, 
although successful in developing low-end manufacturing capacity, has reached a point 
of diminishing returns. Due to higher priced imports and reduced consumer purchasing 
power, currency manipulation is harming China’s plans to rebalance its economy. It is 
also expected that a rise in the RMB will not create more jobs in the United States 
because gains in the low-end manufacturing sector will be offset by losses in high-end 
manufacturing and service sectors. Also, many low-end manufacturing jobs lost to China 
will shift elsewhere in Asia as opposed to returning back to the United States. Lastly, it is 
expected that an appreciation of the RMB will result in lower demand for U.S. debt 
overtime; thereby, creating higher interest rates on U.S. treasuries that will exacerbate the 
U.S. debt problems. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Government Intervention, Exchange Rates, and Economic Theory 
The role of government in exchange rate policies, and the economy in general, is 
a debate that dates back to Adam Smith in the 18th century. Smith argues against 
government intervention. He states that individuals acting in their own self-interest can 
best allocate the resources of a nation. Furthermore, a division of labor allows individuals 
to specialize in certain tasks, and thereby, increase productivity. The natural propensity of 
humans to truck, barter, and exchange allows individuals to obtain a mutual benefit from 
one another and that individuals pursuing their own self-interest most effectively 
promotes the good of society overall.5 
In regard to regulation, Smith argues that no regulation can increase the total 
industry in a nation. It can only divert wealth in an artificial direction and no guarantee 
exists that a new direction is more beneficial to society than where it would have 
                                                 
5 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Naazneen Barma 
and Steven Vogel (New York: Routeledge, 2008), 27–40.  
 5
originally gone.6 Smith lays the theoretical foundation for liberalism, which is the belief 
that countries should not actively intervene in the economy. This theory provides 
opposition to currency manipulation. 
Contrasting Adam Smith’s liberalism, Friedrich List provides an argument for 
mercantilism. List argues that Smith falsely conflates the individual economy with the 
national economy. Individuals acting in their own self-interest will maximize value, but 
will not necessarily develop future productive powers. He further explains that prosperity 
is not proportionate to the amount of wealth amassed, as Smith argued, but rather is 
proportionate to a nation’s capacity to create more wealth. List’s main vehicle for 
productive power was manufacturing. To achieve productive powers, List argues for 
government involvement. He viewed trade as a zero sum game in which nations that had 
already established an industrial base would maintain a comparative advantage. 
Therefore, a government is bound in the interest of the nation to impose duties on foreign 
manufactured goods. List provides the theoretical framework for government 
involvement in economic affairs. This argument would seem to validate currency 
manipulation; so long as it could be shown productive power was increased by such 
action.7 
In regard to exchange rates specifically, Milton Friedman best articulates the 
liberal school of thought. He explains that artificial currency devaluation is a form of 
trade protectionism. Since a weaker currency makes exports cheaper, it acts as an indirect 
subsidy to exporters. Conversely, since imports are more expensive, currency devaluation 
acts as tariff on imports. Both subsidies and tariffs result in misallocation of resources 
away from comparative advantage, and therefore, create a net economic loss.8 
Friedman also argues that a floating exchange rate and free trade of currency will 
in time equalize the balance of trade deficits. He explains that if the United States were to 
run a balance of trade deficit with another country then that country would need to buy 
                                                 
6 Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 27–40. 
7 Friedrich List, National Systems of Political Economy, ed. Naazneen Barma and Steven Vogel (New 
York: Routledge, 2008), 61–72. 
8 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 71–74. 
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dollars. These dollars would then need to be converted into the domestic currency. 
Supply and demand of currencies acts the same as it does for commodities. As the supply 
of dollars increases, the demand decreases, and thereby, decreasing the value of the 
dollar. Conversely, the demand for the domestic currency would increase, thereby, 
increasing its price relative to the dollar. Ultimately, the currencies would equalize 
against each other and level out trade deficits over the long run.9 
The mercantilist school of thought gained legitimacy through the success of the 
developmental state, which is best described by Chalmers Johnson. The developmental 
state has four main tenets. The first is the authoritarian-capitalist nexus, which describes a 
state as having the political might to enforce economic progress. It is also defined by 
politically shielded technical experts that drive the economy. The second tenet is 
industrial policy in which the state actively intervenes on behalf of private businesses. 
This intervention can come in the form of subsidies, tax breaks, import tariffs, and even 
competitive currency devaluation. The third characteristic is broad based education. High 
levels of government investment are used to ensure future human capital. Lastly, 
intervention is done via the price mechanisms. Unlike the communist plan ideological 
model that artificially sets prices, the developmental state does not try to fight the market, 
but rather governs the market.10 
These four characteristics allowed the East Asian countries of Japan, Taiwan, and 
South Korea to develop at exponential rates for decades. This growth is largely attributed 
to state involvement or mercantilism. The success of this model appears to provide 
evidence, at least for developing states, that government involvement in price controls 
and competitive exchange rates may be economically beneficial as a monetary policy. It 
also provides a theoretical basis for the CCP to intervene in China’s currency.  
                                                 
9 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 61–68. 
10 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 
305–324. 
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2. Exchange Rates in Practice 
Whether or not currency devaluation is beneficial to modern economies is a 
subject of abundant literature and extensive studies, but with little consensus. Mohsen 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Ilir Miteza provide a survey of hundreds of case studies and 
dozens of experiments. The authors explain the existence of two schools of thought on 
devaluations. The first, expansionary devaluation, which was championed by the famous 
economist John Maynard Keynes, is derived from the mercantilist school of thought. 
Expansionists argue that a devalued currency will stimulate net exports. This stimulation 
of exports will create a multiplier effect that will increase aggregate demand, as well as 
domestic production and employment. For decades, expansionary devaluation was the 
accepted norm. Over time, however, skeptics noted the failure of currency devaluation  
to increase net output after devaluation. Also, many countries that devalued their 
currency suffered recessions. This inconsistency gave rise to a new school of thought, 
contractionary devaluation. This theory, derived from liberalism, argues that increases in 
aggregate demand from currency devaluation will be offset by reduced aggregate supply 
from more expensive imports. As a result, the overall effect will be a reduction in growth 
and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).11 
The authors break the aggregate research on this topic into four categories. The 
first is the “before-after” approach that examines a country’s economy before and after 
devaluation. Numerous economists used this approach including Richard Cooper and 
Sebastian Edwards. The results were inconclusive as some economists found devaluation 
to be contractionary while others found it to be expansionary. The weakness of this 
approach is that it does not isolate a single variable. The results could be influenced by 
numerous exogenous factors. The second approach is the “control group approach,” 
which compares before and after output performance of devaluing countries against a 
control group. This approach consisted of nearly half a dozen experiments from 
researchers including Donald J. Donavan and Stephan Kamen and looked at well over a 
hundred case studies. Although this approach is superior to the before-after approach, it 
                                                 
11 Mohsen Bahmani-Oskooee and Ilir Miteza, “Are Devaluations Expansionary or Contractionary? A 
Survey Article,” Economic Issues 8 (2003): 1–3. 
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still suffers from an adverse selection problem as the countries selected had bad 
economies to begin with. The third approach is the “macro-simulation” approach, which 
uses simulations from economic models. Nearly 20 models were surveyed including 
studies from Paul Krugman and Lance Taylor. The results from these models show a 
propensity toward the contractionary theory. These models, however, are built on 
hypothetical devaluations and artificial values. Slight changes in any of the subjective 
inputs could change the model. The final model is the “econometric approach,” which 
uses regression analysis on important variables to reach a conclusion. This approach was 
used in nearly 20 studies, but suffers from many of the short falls of the macro-simulation 
approach and provides no conclusive results.12  
Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza provide the definitive summary of research on the 
effects of currency devaluation. Their summary conclusions provide relevant information 
to the research questions. They noted that only a small number of studies concluded that 
devaluation was always expansionary, and many others found that expansion was only 
temporary. Additionally, contraction was not limited to the developing world. Currency 
devaluation in developed countries has led to expansion in some cases and contraction in 
others. Overall, the numerous studies provided conflicting evidence, which led the 
authors to conclude that the effects of currency devaluation are country specific.13 
3. Exchange Rates and the United States 
The impact of China’s currency devaluation on the U.S. economy is another 
subject of contention. As one of America’s largest trading partners, China’s currency 
policies have an effect on the U.S. economy. Critics of China’s exchange rate policy, 
including lawmakers on both sides of the political aisle, are concerned that it 
disadvantages U.S. firms, undermines U.S. security, and steals U.S. jobs.14 This issue is  
 
                                                 
12 Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza, “Are Devaluations Expansionary or Contractionary? A Survey 
Article,” 3–22. 
13 Ibid., 23–24. 
14 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Claire Brunel, “The U.S. Congress and the Chinese Renminbi,” in 
Debating China’s Currency Exchange Rate, ed. Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy (Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, April 2008), 219–232. 
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considered so important that the U.S. treasury provides a twice-yearly report on China’s 
currency policies. Also, the congressional research service has examined these concerns 
in multiple reports. 
To maintain a devalued RMB, the PRC must purchase large amounts of foreign 
reserves, specifically the U.S. dollar and U.S. treasuries. China is currently the largest 
foreign holder of U.S. debt. Many argue that this makes America dependent on China, 
and therefore, U.S. debt can be used for political and economic leverage against the 
United States. Others including Daniel Drezner and Arthur Kroeber argue that concerns 
over debt are overinflated because China is equally reliant on the United States. Since 
China holds so much debt, it would be harmed by a drastic price shock to the U.S. dollar. 
Also, as a percentage of overall debt, China only holds a small fraction. The majority 
owners of U.S. debt are Americans. Despite these arguments, many American lawmakers 
are concerned about the level of debt, and have advocated a stronger stance against 
China’s RMB devaluations.15  
The Economic Policy Institute and famed economist Paul Krugman argue that 
with less than full employment, the liberal argument against protectionism is invalid. He 
explains that the Chinese artificially peg their currency to the dollar, and thereby, 
undermines the market’s ability to equalize currencies. The result is an artificial trade 
surplus for China and reduced demand for U.S. goods, which has resulted in the loss of 
more than 2.7 million U.S. jobs over the last decade.16 Other economists including Derek 
Scissors and Ray C. Fair counter this argument by pointing out that RMB appreciation 
also leads to reduced imports for China, much of which comes from the United States. 
Furthermore, Fair explains that the increased price of Chinese imports will reduce the real 
wages of U.S. consumers, which will have a contractionary effect on U.S. demand and 
                                                 
15 Wayne Morrison and Marc Labonte, China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S. 
Economy, CRS Report RL34314 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
2013), 10; Arthur Kroeber, “The Renminbi: The Political Economy of a Currency,” Foreign Policy, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/07 /the_renminbi_the_political_economy_of_a_currency; 
Daniel Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” International 
Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 10. 
16 Krugman, “Chinese New Year”; Scott, “The China Toll: Growing U.S. Trade Deficit with China 
Cost More Than 2.7 Million Jobs Between 2001 and 2011, With Job Losses in Every State.” 
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output. In other words, gains in employment from an appreciated RMB would be offset 
due to lower consumption from higher domestic prices. To support his claim, Fair 
provides a macro-economic model, similar to the ones examined by Bahmani-Oskooee 
and Miteza.17 This evidence provides more legitimacy to Fair’s argument, but it is 
important to note that experts within the United States disagree over the effect of China’s 
monetary policies. 
4. Exchange Rates and China 
The impact of currency devaluation on the Chinese economy is also a subject of 
much study. Nicholas Lardy, of the Peterson Institute, argues that the policies that have 
driven China’s growth in the past will not be as effective in the future.18 In the past, 
China’s economy has been largely driven by government investment. The income for that 
investment has come largely from exports. Lardy notes, and the CCP acknowledges in 
their 12th FYP, that this strategy is not sustainable. Although China weathered the 2008 
financial crisis relatively well, its GDP growth has slowed over the past seven quarters. 
For continued growth in the future, China will need to rebalance from an export driven 
economy and government investment to a consumption driven economy. Lardy argues 
that the exchange rate policy needs to be reformed to do so. Additionally, Lardy broadly 
identifies some of the winners and losers of China’s exchange rate policy. Most 
importantly, China’s consumers lose because import prices are artificially high, which 
makes the price of consumer goods higher and reduces real wages. To have consumption 
driven growth, Beijing will need to reform its exchange rate policy and empower 
consumers.19 Lardy’s book provides a foundation on which to further explore the impact 
of devaluation on specific groups in China, and necessary exchange rate policy reform is 
needed to rebalance their economy. 
                                                 
17 Ray C. Fair, “Estimated Macroeconomic Effects of a Chinese Yuan Appreciation,” Cowles 
Foundation for Research in Economics Yale University, 2010, 2; Derek Scissors, “Deadlines and Delays: 
Chinese Revolution Will Still Not Bring American Jobs,” Heritage Foundation, no. 2855 (2012). 
18 Nicholas Lardy, Sustaining China’s Economic Growth After the Global Financial Crisis 
(Washington, DC: The Peterson Institute, 2012), 2. 
19 Ibid., 56.  
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The literature pertaining to currency devaluation falls into two main schools of 
thought. The first is liberalism, which argues that artificial devaluation is ineffective 
because it merely redistributes gains as opposed to increasing net gains. The second is 
mercantilism, which argues that devaluation is beneficial because it can increase 
aggregate exports, which would create a multiplier effect, and therefore, growth. 
Additionally, devaluation could allow a developing country to establish industrial 
capacity. Extensive research on this subject has proven inconclusive. To determine 
whether devaluation is beneficial or not, each country must be considered on a case-by-
case basis. This research seeks to add to the existing literature by examining China 
specifically. Many sources have identified winners and losers of devaluation in a broad 
sense, but further research must be done to identify specific groups, businesses, and 
industries helped and harmed by devaluation and how they would be affected by 
revaluation. 
Current literature on exchange rate policy focuses largely on the national effects 
of changing values of RMB. Many of the aforementioned authors mention sectors 
affected in general terms, but research on the specific sectors that will be harmed by 
changes to exchange rates is lacking. This research intends to add to the field of 
knowledge by identifying many of the specific sectors affected by China’s exchange rate 
policies, and how these sectors may benefit from a more flexible exchange rate.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The primary methods of this research are economic analysis and comparative 
study, but also include a small amount of historical study. Aside from the references 
discussed in the literature, this study also analyzes primary sources from the 
Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Investment Bureau Annual 
Reports, as well as the 53 sectors of the U.S. economy and the Chinese equivalent. As per 
the literature review, no conclusive proof was found that currency devaluation is 
expansionary or contractionary, but rather, varies case by case. This study seeks to 
identify key winners and losers of an artificially devalued RMB in both the United States 
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and China. Next, China’s economy is evaluated and contrasted with that of the United 
States to determine whether or not devaluation is preventing rebalancing. Specifically, 
high import sectors in the Chinese economy that may benefit from a RMB revaluation, as 
well as competing sectors in the United States, are identified. Lastly, America’s debt is 
studied to determine how a more valuable RMB may affect demand for U.S. treasuries. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis argues that China’s current exchange rate policy is an impediment to 
consumption driven growth in China. Conversely, it is argued that outcries against the 
PRC’s exchange rate policy in the United States is over exaggerated, and that an 
appreciation of the RMB will not necessarily benefit the U.S. economy, but rather may 
have negative consequences. To prove this argument, it is necessary to understand the 
nature of China’s economic growth, examine the role of exchange rate policies in this 
growth, identify sectors harmed by the current policy, and explain how those hurt by the 
current policy are needed for consumption driven growth. For the United States, a similar 
process is used to explain how losers of China’s exchange rate policy will not necessarily 
win by an appreciated RMB due to the inelasticity of China’s exchange rate, and the 
existence of other low cost competitors in the international community. 
The nature of the international monetary arrangement, the history of China’s 
exchange rate, and the process through which it maintain its peg is explained in Chapter 
II. Chapter III explains imbalances within the Chinese economy in the context of its 
investment driven growth model. Additionally, an examination of the current exchange 
rate policy follow to show how consumers, who are necessary for consumption driven 
growth, have been harmed by current policies. Chapter IV examines how China’s 
exchange rate policy acts as an impediment to the PRC’s goals of rebalancing to 
consumption driven growth.  
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II. CHINA’S EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
Chapter II provides background on important factors affecting China’s exchange 
rate policy, as well as an overview of its investment driven economic model. China’s 
exchange rate has changed considerably over the decades. The international monetary 
system, or lack thereof, has allowed the Peoples Bank of China (PBoC) to fix the RMB to 
a basket of currencies below market levels. This fixed system has allowed for relative 
stability as the RMB adjusts to market pressures. Despite this stability, China’s policies 
have undermined the purchasing power of its citizens, as well as accumulated unhealthy 
levels of foreign reserve. Its undervalued currency has allowed the Chinese economy to 
grow dramatically over the last several decades. China is the world leader in 
manufacturing and exports due largely to state-led investments that have benefited from 
an undervalued currency. Growth from the investment-led model; however, is beginning 
to slow, and China will need to adjust to a more consumption-led model in the future for 
continued growth. 
A. GLOBAL MONETARY ARRANGEMENT 
To understand the implications of China’s exchange rate policy, it is first 
necessary to understand exchange rates and how they fit into the global monetary 
structure. The global structure has evolved greatly over the last century and a half. 
Between 1870 and 1914, the major economies of the world pegged their currencies to 
gold. This arrangement worked well due to the relative tranquility of the pre-WWI era. 
However, the gold standard did not provide governments with flexibility in response to 
global shocks, such as world wars, commodities shocks, or the great depression. The 
interwar era made it clear that a new system was needed. In 1944, monetary leaders from 
developed countries around the world, including John Maynard Keynes, met at Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire to develop a new international structure. The main characteristic 
of the new Bretton Woods system was an adjustable peg. Nations pegged their currency 
to the U.S. dollar, which was to be convertible to gold. To monitor currency stability and 
lend money to troubled nations, the IMF and World Bank were created. The Bretton 
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Woods system was successful for over 20 years; however, aspects of this system 
including one way speculation and an overly strained dollar caused the United States to 
abandon convertibility to gold in 1971, and then abandoned the gold standard completely 
in 1973. Since then, the system that emerged can best be described as a non-system with 
no overarching guiding principle. As a result, countries are free to choose between a 
floating or fixed exchange rate policies. Many choose a managed float, whereby, they 
allow rate adjustment within a narrow band of fluctuation. The dollar still remains the 
predominant world currency. The merits of the current system are still a matter of debate. 
Floating exchange rates are more susceptible to large fluctuations and fixed exchange 
rates are difficult to maintain. It is within this non-system that China has managed its 
exchange rate policy.20 
Before a discussion of the details of China’s current policy, it is important to 
explain exchange rates in a bit more depth. An exchange rate is simply the price of one 
nation’s currency relative to another nation’s currency. For example, it currently takes 
about six RMB to equal one U.S. dollar, so the exchange rate in terms of dollars is 6.12. 
This rate can also be expressed in terms of RMB as .16 dollars equals one RMB. 
Governments can manage this policy either through fixed or floating exchange rates. A 
floating exchange rate leaves the price of currency up to the market. Supply and demand 
are the main components of price. In a fixed exchange rate, governments peg their 
currency to another currency. The U.S. dollar is the most common peg; however, many 
nations including China have pegged their currency to a basket of currencies also referred 
to as a special drawing right (SDR). Often times, countries will choose to appreciate or 
depreciate their currency relative to the peg overtime. This situation is referred to as a 
crawling or managed peg.  
Exchange rates are important to international trade because they allow trade in 
different currencies and they affect the relative prices of goods and services between 
countries. Imagine a U.S. importer trying to buy Chinese products from an exporter. The 
exporter will expect payment in RMB; however, the importer only has U.S. dollars. For 
                                                 
20 Tomas A. Pugel, International Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2009), 490–500. 
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the trade to happen, the importer will need to convert his dollars to RMB, which is done 
through the foreign exchange market. These markets are massive. In 2007, an estimated 
3.2 trillion trades were made per day.21 The foreign exchange market is also 
multilayered. At the most basic level, the importer will be able to exchange currency 
through an international bank at the current exchange rate. At a higher level, the amount 
of foreign currency that banks have to transfer is based on a nation’s central banks. 
Governments can intervene at this level to maintain a fixed exchange rate. An exchange 
rate pegged artificially low will reduce the prices of its goods relative to a higher valued 
currency, which benefits exporters and import-competing businesses. Conversely, an 
artificially low currency will harm importers and decrease the purchasing power of 
consumers.22 
Monetary authorities can take various steps to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market and defend a fixed exchange rate. The first and most prevalent means is by 
purchasing foreign currency in exchange for domestic currency. This process reduces the 
supply of foreign currencies and increases the supply of domestic currencies in the 
exchange, thereby, placing downward pressure on the cost of domestic currencies. 
Secondly, monetary authorities can impose exchange controls, which are restrictions to 
who can and cannot access and convert domestic currency. Thirdly, would be to adjust 
domestic interest rates to influence capital flow. Lower interest rates would increase 
spending and investments thereby lowering capital held in banks. This process increases 
supply and lowers the exchange price. Lastly, a country can adjust its monetary and fiscal 
policies to increase or decrease demand for international capital flows.23 An example 
would be the U.S. Federal Reserve policy of quantitative easing. This policy increases the 
supply of money, and thereby, decreases the price of dollars. 
The implications of defending an exchange rate can vary greatly depending on the 
length of intervention. Countries with a fixed exchange rate normally allow their 
currency to adjust up or down within a range of the fixed currency, i.e., 3% up or down. 
                                                 
21 Pugel, International Economics, 403.  
22 Ibid., 473.  
23 Ibid., 478.  
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If macroeconomic factors force the currency above or below this band, the central bank 
can intervene by adjusting the domestic supply. This process can provide stability for a 
nation’s currency, and therefore, benefit economic growth. As long as the disequilibrium 
created is temporary, countries can inflate and deflate indefinitely. If disequilibrium is 
non-temporary, and macroeconomic forces are continually driving domestic currency to 
appreciate or depreciate, then government intervention over a period of time can have 
significant negative implications. For instance, Thailand attempted to maintain an 
overvalued baht, but was forced to sell foreign reserves to do so. Unfortunately, it acted 
against market forces too long, which resulted in a depletion of its foreign reserves. 
Unable to maintain the peg, the baht was revalued by the market nearly overnight, which 
imploded its economy. Conversely, a country like China that wants to maintain a 
devalued currency will be required to purchase foreign reserves continuously to fight 
appreciation. This problem is twofold. Firstly, by purchasing the foreign currency, the 
supply is reduced so the cost to purchase will increase overtime. Secondly, as market 
forces push up the value of the domestic currency, the value of the foreign reserves 
decreases. It is a negative investment since the losses are increased the longer the process 
occurs.24 
B. DEFENDING CHINA’S EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
For decades, China has actively intervened in the exchange rate market to keep 
the value of the RMB artificially deflated. Prior to 1994, it maintained a dual rate system 
whereby the importers and exporters developed a somewhat market-based exchange rate 
of RMB8.70 to USD in a “swap market.” While the Chinese government maintained tight 
control of its currency, privileged importers were allowed RMB5.77 at an official 
government rate. In 1994, the Central Bank of China unified the two rates at 8.70, which 
was considered to be undervalued, but was allowed to appreciate gradually to RMB8.28 
by 1997 where it remained until 2005. During this time, China utilized a fixed exchange 
rate pegged to the U.S. dollar.25 In July 2005, Beijing announced that it would abandon a 
                                                 
24 Pugel, International Economics, 483–486.  
25 Lardy, Sustaining China’s Economic Growth After the Global Financial, 103.  
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peg to the dollar in exchange for a basket of currencies called a SDR. It is important to 
note that China did not release the proportions of that SDR, and based on stability 
between the dollar and the RMB between 2008 and 2010, many experts have claimed that 
China still pegs to the U.S. dollar or at least predominantly to the U.S. dollar.26 This new 
system referred to as a “managed float” allows the RMB to appreciate in the direction of 
the market, but still gave China the ability to manage the pace of appreciation. Between 
July 2005 and July 2008, the RMB appreciated from 8.28 to 6.83, an appreciation of 
nearly 2%. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, however, the Central Bank of China 
intervened to halt appreciation to support exporters who had been harmed by reduced 
demand. By early 2010, Beijing once again allowed the RMB to appreciate gradually up 
to its current level of RMB6.12 as of September 2013.27 
 
Figure 1.  China/U.S. Exchange Rate Since 198028 
China has developed a complicated process of intervention to defend its exchange 
rate. Beginning in 2003, China’s central bank has intervened extensively in the foreign 
exchange market by purchasing foreign currencies, mainly U.S. dollars, with newly 
                                                 
26 Morrison and Labonte, China’s Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues, 2.  
27 Pugel, International Economics, 487; Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
“China and U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,” modified 
September 18, 2013, www.research.stlouisfed.org.  
28 Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “China and U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.” 
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minted RMB. This process reduces the supply of U.S. dollars and increases the supply of 
RMB, and thereby, devalues the RMB relative to the USD. Without further action by the 
Chinese central bank, this process would lead to high levels of inflation in China due to 
the increased supply of RMB. In response, the Chinese have implemented a process of 
sterilization to reduce available domestic supply. 
The process of sterilization involves two steps. In the first step, the Central Bank 
of China issues interest-bearing bills to state-controlled commercial banks in exchange 
for RMB. These bills generate very low interest rates, approximately 1.7% for three-
month bills and 2.1% for one-year bills to keep the cost of sterilization low.29 Normally, 
this action would be harmful to banks due to the low yields. To compensate banks for the 
low yields, the central bank administratively lowers the deposit rate banks lend to savers. 
In effect, savers in China actually receive a negative return in their bank accounts when 
factoring in inflation. This process allows China to reduce its money supply and allows 
banks to remain profitable, but forces savers to lose money. The second step of the 
process is an increased required reserve level. The reserve level is the amount of money 
banks are required to maintain on hand. The reserve requirement rose from 6% to 18.5% 
between 2003 and 2010. By increasing the amount of money held in banks, the central 
bank simultaneously reduces the domestic supply, and therefore, the appreciation of the 
RMB. This process allows China to purchase foreign reserves without creating inflation 
in the domestic currency.  
Although China is able to intervene in the foreign exchange market without 
causing domestic inflation, several other negative implications of their current policy 
result. One such implication is the opportunity cost of the money used to sterilize foreign 
currency purchases. Although commercial banks receive a small return from the central 
bank bills, the money used to purchase these bills could have earned higher rates 
elsewhere. At the end of 2010, commercial banks held nearly RMB4 trillion central bank 
bills earning around 2%. The average alternative investment for commercial banks, 
however, was over 6%. This 4% percent spread constitutes an implicit tax equivalent to 
                                                 
29 Lardy, Sustaining China’s Economic Growth After the Global Financial Crisis, 97. 
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RMB170 billion or .4% of GDP. Similarly, the reserve level mandated by the central 
bank, earns an even smaller return and constitutes a larger sum resulting in an implicit tax 
of nearly RMB450 billion or 1% of GDP. As mentioned previously, much of this loss is 
then pushed on to savers through negative deposit rates. 
Another negative implication is the ever-growing sum of foreign currency 
reserves. As mentioned in the previous section, accumulating foreign exchange reserves 
to maintain a peg on a non-temporary basis will lead to a loss when the domestic 
currency is revalued in line with market forces, which is a concern for China because it 
holds $3.5 trillion as of June 2013. To offset this loss and better utilize their foreign 
exchange reserves, the PBoC engages in the purchase of investments that include U.S. 
treasuries, U.S. agency debt, U.S. corporate debt, and U.S. equities. As of June 2012, 
these purchases totaled $1.6 trillion.30 As long as the interest on these investments 
surpasses the appreciation of the RMB, the PBoC avoids a loss on its current holdings. 
Despite this assurance, China becomes increasingly vulnerable to global shocks that 
could cause defaults on these investments. Also, foreign nations, particularly the United 
States and the European Union, see the accumulation of foreign exchange as a 
manifestation of unfair trade practices. This concern has led many U.S. policy makers to 
advocate legislation that would impose a countervailing tariff on Chinese imports. 
Although China has been able to offset a loss in its holdings of foreign reserves due to 
investments, it is clear that this process is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.31 
                                                 
30 Morrison and Marc Labonte, China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S. 
Economy, 1–2. 
31 Morrison and Labonte, China’s Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues, 9.  
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Figure 2.  China’s Holdings of U.S. Dollars32 33 
This section highlights how China maintains its exchange rate, but also shows that 
exchange rate policy does not exist in a vacuum. Other policies including capital controls, 
financial repression, and foreign reserve acquisitions are all intrinsically linked to 
maintaining a devalued currency. These policies reduce the value of the RMB by 
controlling the international supply but also simultaneously prevent domestic inflation. 
This combination has allowed the PRC to borrow cheaply and has greatly contributed to 
China’s investment-driven growth model. 
C. CHINA’S INVESTMENT-DRIVEN ECONOMY 
China’s economic growth since reforms in 1979 has been nothing short of 
miraculous. GDP growth has averaged 10% a year and an estimated 500 million citizens 
have been lifted out of poverty. The reforms opened China’s economy to market forces 
while maintaining an authoritarian regime with the CCP in control. This system of 
government directed capitalism is often described as socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. Its system is very similar to the developmental state model described by 
Chalmers Johnson. It differs, however, in that the Chinese have allowed much greater 
                                                 
32 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2013), 8–37. 
33 Gwynn Guilford, “Slowly But Surely, China Is Shedding Its Treasury Holdings,” October 2013, 
http://qz.com/138671/slowly-but-surely-china-is-shedding-its-treasury-holdings/. 
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amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) than its East Asian counterparts and have 
allowed the state a stronger hand in investments.34 The driving force behind China’s 
growth is state directed investments in human and especially physical capital. These 
investments have developed an enormous manufacturing infrastructure, as well as 
attracted large amounts of FDI; however, recent growth has slowed and doubts have been 
raised as to whether the current system will be as successful going forward. 
Economic growth is derived from physical capital, human capital, and total factor 
productivity, which manifest themselves in consumption, government investments, and 
net trade surplus. China’s GDP growth is driven largely by government investments and 
trade surplus. Investments include infrastructure, development, real estate, manufacturing 
capacity, social housing, and subsidies to the nation’s numerous state-owned enterprises 
(SOE). Additionally, much of the country’s investments are delegated to local regions. 
These regions, in turn, invest in other projects like subways, airports, luxury condos, and 
five-star hotels for example. Nearly 50% of China’s GDP growth can be attributed to 
investments.35 For decades, these investments have generated revenue by eliminating 
overcapacity in high demand sectors, as well as providing more efficient labor allocation. 
The revenue from these investments has been allocated to other investments designed to 
stimulate growth and industrial capacity. Net exports are another contributing factor to 
economic growth. In 2010, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s 
largest manufacturer on a gross value added basis, and in 2012, surpassed the United 
States as the world’s largest trading economy. A combination of low wages, foreign 
investments, and competition-facilitating programs like subsidies, infrastructure 
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factory, generating 18% annual export growth since 1990. Between 2001 and 2008, net 
exports combined with government investments, accounted for over 60% of China’s GDP 
growth.36 
Beginning in the early 1990s, FDI became another major driver of China’s 
economic growth. In 2010, China registered 445,244 foreign investment enterprises 
(FIE), which employed 55.2 million workers. These enterprises have comprised a 
growing percentage of industrial output. In 1990, only 2.3% of output was a result of 
FIEs, but by 2010, that output was up to 27 percent. Also, these enterprises are 
responsible for 52.4% of exports and 49.6% of imports as of 2011. FDI is important to 
the Chinese economy because it creates revenue and employment. Just as importantly, 
FDI is responsible for massive amounts of innovation and total factor productivity. For 
decades, China has adapted technology and processes from foreign firms that will be 
necessary to drive growth in the future.37 
Much of the growth in government investments and net exports has come at the 
expense of consumption. As mentioned above, China’s exchange rate policy acts as a de 
facto tariff on imports, which results in higher consumer prices, and therefore, reduces 
purchasing power for consumers. Additionally, the financial suppression required to 
purchase foreign currency and sterilize domestic currency has resulted in extremely low 
interest rates on savings. This attack on savings further undermines consumer purchasing 
power. Between 1990 and 2012, China’s GDP share of fixed investments rose from  
25% to 45.4%; meanwhile, during that same period, private consumption fell from  
48.8% of GDP to 36.3%. As a result, China has the lowest private consumption share of 
GDP than any other major economy.38 
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This model of growth, however, is unlikely to be as successful going forward as it 
has been in the past. Continued growth requires revenue. Much of the low-hanging fruit 
has been picked in China. Infrastructure investments, such as land, resources, and most 
importantly demand, are constrained. Investments in a new airport will boost GDP by 
government spending, but revenue will only be generated if businesses and travelers 
actually utilize that airport. Government investment is most successful in the early stages 
as it is able easily to identify and satisfy economic demand. As time goes on however, 
these investments become increasingly scarce and lower-return investments are 
utilized.39 Also, increasing wages will slow manufacturing exports. As marginal 
productivity of China’s workforce increases, so will its wages. China’s wage advantage is 
slowly diminishing. Between 2000 and 2012, real wages increased at an annual rate of  
11%.40 Competing countries like Mexico and Vietnam now have significantly lower 
wage rates compared to China. This trend will gradually erode China’s beneficial export 
surplus. 
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Figure 3.  A Gradual Decrease in GDP Growth and Net Exports Since 200741  
For decades, China has pegged its currency to the U.S. dollar at an artificially low 
rate. This policy has protected exporters and import-competing businesses at the expense 
of consumers. This policy, however, has led to massive amounts of foreign reserves that 
will make China increasingly vulnerable to global shocks, as well as undermine national 
wealth once the RMB is allowed to float. History has shown that countries that fight the 
trend of the market in regard to their currency for too long end up facing economic 
disaster. Although China’s investment-led growth model has been successful in the past, 
higher wages and lower return on government investments will eventually result in 
slower GDP growth. 
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III. ECONOMIC IMBALANCES 
China’s economic rise has been nothing short of miraculous. Utilizing strong state 
intervention in investments and currency, China has successfully developed a strong 
industrial capacity as advocated by Friedrich List. However, as Friedman of the liberalist 
perspective would argue, state intervention will lead to a misallocation of resources, 
which will result in imbalanced growth. This prediction appears to have been vindicated. 
In 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao described China’s growth as “unsteady, imbalanced, 
uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”42 The distortions in China’s economy have been 
affected by its exchange rate policy. These distortions have differing impacts on different 
sectors within the economy. Exporters, for example, receive an implicit subsidy, whereas 
importers are burdened with an implicit tariff. The artificial winners and losers of 
exchange rates imbalances are identified in this section. This chapter argues that China’s 
exchange rate policy has contributed to economic imbalances that have benefitted exports 
and import-competing businesses at the expense of services, imports, consumers, and the 
financial sector. Also, since the economies of China and the United States are 
intertwined, the American economy will also experience a level of imbalance that creates 
artificial winners in consumption and high-end manufacturing, but harms exporters and 
import-competing businesses. 
A. CHINA’S ECONOMIC IMBALANCES 
The imbalances in China’s economy can be seen in national expenditures and 
production. The expenditure approach looks at consumption (private and government), 
investment, and net exports. This approach shows that Chinese household consumption 
has been suppressed in favor of investment. Three common components are used to 
measure GDP: consumption, investment, and net exports of goods and services. Prior to 
2003, consumption amounted to nearly four-fifths of GDP. After 2003, however, this 
trend began to decrease, and by 2010, consumption was only two-fifths of GDP. During 
this time, government consumption remained relatively stable, but household 
                                                 
42 Lardy, Sustaining China’s Economic Growth After the Global Financial Crisis, 44.  
 26
consumption bore the majority of the decline. A decrease in consumption as a percentage 
of GDP was offset by increases in investment and net exports. Investment in particular 
has increased from 36% of GDP in the decade following reform to more than 50% of 
GDP from 2003–2010, a level significantly higher than the East Asian countries at the 
height of their investments. Similarly, net exports increased from 2.4% in 2004 up to 
8.8% of GDP in 2007. This number has since decreased in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, but still remains above 4%. The expenditure approach shows increases in 
investment and net exports, but a decrease in consumption. 
 
Figure 4.  Visual Representation of Expenditure Approach43 
These numbers are not surprising. China’s exchange rate policy acts as a subsidy 
to exports and a tariff on imports, which makes investment cheaper and consumption 
more expensive. Consumption is important because it reflects the well-being of a nation’s 
citizens. China’s current growth from consumption averages around 34% whereas other 
more developed nations like the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) average 
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70% and 63%, respectively. Also, other developing countries, such as India, are driven by 
a consumption rate of around 56 percent.44 The expenditure approach shows that China’s 
exchange rate policy is harming consumption in favor of government investment. 
Another measure of imbalance in the Chinese economy can be seen in the 
production structure: agriculture, industry, and services. Prior to reforms in 1978, 
agriculture accounted for nearly 30% of GDP. By 2010, it had dropped to less than 10%, 
which is typical for a country moving from low-income to middle-income. China’s 
services and industry, however, have not developed along historical lines. A commonly 
observed pattern of economic development shows an increasing percentage of services 
reflect sustainable growth. Starting in the early 2000s, industry or tradable goods became 
an increasingly large share of GDP, and accounted for 47% in 2010. By contrast, services 
or nontradable goods stagnated, and only increased 1.5% between 2002 and 2010. 
Comparable states have services contributing 54% of GDP, whereas China’s services 
only contribute 41.8%.45  
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Figure 5.  Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China on Agriculture, Services, 
and Industry as a percentage of GDP from 1981–201246 
The distortion in China’s production structure has been largely influenced by its 
exchange rate policy. Beginning in 2002, the RMB became increasingly devalued on a 
trade-weighted basis, which thus led to large trade imbalances. An undervalued currency 
benefits exporters because they receive a greater amount of domestic currency for each 
dollar’s worth sold on the international markets. In other words, they have more RMB 
left over after expenses, and therefore, more profit. Conversely, those who wish to import 
foreign goods are forced to pay more in terms of domestic currency for a dollar’s worth 
of goods. Imports are, therefore, more expensive, which allows import-competing 
businesses to raise their prices and increase profitability. It is important to note that 
devalued currency brings increased profitability to firms, both exporting and import-
competing, that produce tradable goods as opposed to nontradable (services). This 
artificial incentive structure is responsible for China’s imbalanced production structure in 
two ways. First, China’s economy is predominantly market oriented. Investments will be 
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allocated based off profitability. The increased profitability of tradable goods and the 
decreased profitability of nontradable goods have resulted in excessive investment flows 
into the industry sector and decreased flow into the service sector. Second, domestic 
factor prices are distorted. As mentioned in the previous section, much of China’s growth 
is a result of government investment. This investment is disproportionately targeted 
toward tradable goods at subsidized prices. Additionally, the financial repression utilized 
to keep domestic interest rates low, undermines consumer purchasing power. The result is 
greater capital flows to industry and reduced capital flows to services. An appreciation of 
the RMB would allow for greater purchasing power for consumers, and therefore, greater 
demand for services.47 
B. ECONOMIC IMBALANCE: WINNERS AND LOSERS 
China’s exchange rate policy has several implications on the national level to 
include financial repression and capital controls, but the impacts of this policy also have 
varying effects on different sectors within the Chinese economy. The economic 
imbalances created by China’s exchange rate policy have created artificial winners and 
losers. Many of these groups have been briefly discussed. This section identifies in 
greater detail those sectors of society that benefit and those harmed by China’s exchange 
rate policy.  
1. Winners 
As was seen by the production approach, exporters and the sectors that support 
them are major winners in the current structure. A devalued currency acts as a subsidy to 
exporters to allow exporters to receive a greater profit and increased market share against 
competitors in the United States using the higher valued dollar. The greater profitability 
also attracts greater levels of investment from the government and foreign direct 
investment. is the following table shows a list of China’s top exporters. Nearly all top 
exporters are in manufacturing. Although China has a comparative advantage in 
manufacturing because it has a large supply of labor, this advantage is exacerbated by the 
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implicit subsidy of a devalued RMB. The large labor supply drives down wages, which 
lowers operating costs for manufacturers. This industry has also benefited from large 
amounts of government investment, as was mentioned in the last chapter. China’s 
exchange rate policy along with low wages and government investment has unduly 
benefitted exporters and low-end manufacturing firms. 
 
China’s Top Exporters Revenue in 
Dollars 
Percent of Total 
Exports 
1. Electronic equipment $487,462,307,000 23.8% 
2. Machinery $376,002,094,000 18.3% 
3. Knit or crochet clothing and 
accessories 
$87,059,741,000 4.2% 
4. Furniture, lighting , signs and 
prefabricated buildings 
$77,904,042,000 3.8% 
5. Optical, technical and medical 
apparatus 
$72,816,793,000 3.6% 
6. Non-knit and non-crochet 
clothing and accessories 
$61,237,963,000 3.0% 
7. Iron or steel articles $56,202,059,000 2.7% 
8. Plastics $55,218,364,000 2.7% 
9. Vehicles excluding trains and 
streetcars 
$55,174,251,000 2.7% 
10. Footwear $46,817,564,000 2.3% 
Table 1.   Data from China’s Top 10 Exports48 
The manufacturing sector is not affected equally across the board however. High-
end manufacturing in sectors like automobiles and electronics require large amounts of 
inputs from abroad, and therefore, have higher expenses because they are forced to pay a 
higher price for their imported components. Low-end manufacturing that produces 
smaller goods with fewer inputs from abroad fare better. A more flexible exchange rate 
policy would actually benefit high-end manufacturing by reducing the costs of their 
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inputs. Overall exports would likely decrease, but China’s low wage advantage would 
keep it as a manufacturing powerhouse for the foreseeable future. 
Other beneficiaries of the current imbalances are import-competing businesses, 
which sell products domestically and compete with foreign goods. RMB undervaluation 
acts as a subsidy to exporters, but also as a tariff on imports that drives up the relative 
price of foreign competing goods, which allows import-competing businesses to raise 
their prices. These inflated prices provide import-competing firms with a higher level of 
profits than they would have had if China allowed the RMB to appreciate to market 
levels. A more flexible exchange rate policy would increase competition between 
importers and domestic market suppliers. Import-competing businesses would lose profit, 
but other sectors of society would benefit. 
2. Losers 
Although several sectors benefit from China’s economic imbalances, several 
losers include importers, consumers, services, and the financial sector. A devalued RMB 
places an implicit tariff on importers. Estimates for the level of RMB undervaluation vary 
significantly between 12% and 24%.49 In other words, an equivalent tariff on U.S. 
imports to China results. Other major importers including South Korea, Japan, and 
Germany also face varying implicit tariffs. Top imports from these countries and the 
United States include vehicles, machines, engines, pumps, electronic equipment, medical 
equipment, and technical equipment. High-end manufacturing goods are not the only 
important imports. Raw materials including plastic, copper, rubber, wood pulp, iron, and 
steel are also very important. The implicit tariff on these raw materials will negatively 
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China’s Top U.S. imports Cost in U.S. dollars 
1. Oil seed $15.7 billion 
2. Machines, engines, pumps $14.7 billion 
3. Electronic equipment $14.3 billion 
4. Medical, technical 
equipment 
$10.1 billion 
5. Vehicles $8.2 billion 
6. Aircraft, spacecraft $7.6 billion 
7. Plastics $6.3 billion 
8. Wood pulp $4.4 billion 
9. Organic chemicals $4.2 billion 
10. Copper $4.1 billion 
Table 2.   U.S. Exports to China Amounted to $128.6 Billion or  
7.4% of Overall Chinese Imports in 201251 
Consumers and savers are also significantly harmed by China’s economic 
imbalance that results in more expensive imports. Import-competing businesses are able 
to raise their prices artificially due to the implicit tariff created by the exchange rate 
policy. Thus, the domestic market faces less competition, while consumers face higher 
prices. A devalued RMB shifts income from consumers to exporters and import-
competing businesses. Consumers are also hurt by the financial repression required to 
maintain a devalued currency. To keep inflation low, the PBOC has established low 
interest rates on savings. This process harms individual savers to allow the government to 
borrow at low rates. Capital controls imposed by the PRC to limit inflation prevents 
savers from seeking out higher yielding foreign investments, which further undermines 
the wealth of the average citizen. A more flexible exchange rate would eliminate the need 
to keep artificially low rates on savings and would increase the wealth of consumers.52 
Another loser of current policies is China’s service sector. Often referred to as the 
tertiary sector, services are exchanges of nontradable goods in expertise and time that 
increase productivity. Examples include telecommunications, tourism, hospitality, 
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financial services, government, healthcare, consulting, education, and information 
technology. Demand signals for services are far more dispersed and less apparent than 
manufacturing, and therefore, less attractive for government investing. A more flexible 
exchange rate would put more money in the hands of consumers. Millions of consumers 
acting in their own self-interest would better allocate resources to fill the various demand 
signals in the service sector. Although it is not possible calculate where millions of 
individuals would invest their extra money in the event of a more flexible exchange rate, 
it is safe to expect an increase in transportation, health and social services, and retail 
sales, which currently comprise 30% of service employment.53 
 
Fastest Growing Services 2006–2009 Percentage Growth 
Leasing and Business 29.0% 
Real Estate 28.0% 
ICT 18.3% 
Healthcare and Welfare 8.2% 
Hotels and Catering 6.9% 
Scientific Research 6.1% 
Education 4.3% 
Finance 4.0% 
Table 3.   Service Sector Growth from the State of China Atlas (2009)54 
Financial Institutions are another loser of China’s exchange rate policy. State-
controlled banks are able to make a profit on the difference between the rate offered on 
notes from the PBoC and the interest they must pay to depositors.  While appearing to be 
beneficial, opportunity cost must also be considered. Banks only make around 2% on the 
notes from the PBoC. Money that is tied up with these low return investments could be 
used to fund higher yielding investments. Another aspect of financial loss comes from 
large holdings of U.S. currency and treasuries. These investments were purchased when 
the dollar was strong compared to the RMB, but as market forces overtime push the RMB 
to appreciate, a loss of value of China’s holdings would result. Also, the money that has 
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been used to purchase U.S. dollars to keep the RMB undervalued has an opportunity cost. 
Had this money been left to the private sector in the form of reduced taxes, citizens 
would have had more money to drive consumption and services.55 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The United States, as one of China’s main trading partners, is also affected by 
China’s exchange rate policies. How the United States has been affected is a matter of 
significant discourse and study.56 Discussions on whether the United States should label 
China a currency manipulator and impose countervailing tariffs have been subject to 
intense public debate. Several political leaders from both sides of the political aisle have 
introduced legislation against China’s policies. The issue was even brought up during the 
2012 presidential campaign. The issue is deemed so important that the Treasury 
Department is required to submit an update on the PRC’s policies semi-annually. 
Although the extent of China’s exchange rate policy may still be unclear, it is possible to 
identify the sectors in the economy that are harmed and the sectors that are benefitted by 
a devalued RMB. Not surprisingly, the artificial winners and losers in America are the 
inverse to those in China.  
Exports and companies that compete with Chinese imports are harmed by an 
undervalued RMB because it makes Chinese products less expensive to consumers and 
U.S. exports to China more expensive. Much of the harm of an undervalued RMB has 
come at the expense of the manufacturing sector. It has been estimated that several 
million jobs have been lost to China over the last decade.57 Others argue that the number 
is much smaller, and that China’s advantage is due mostly to its large labor force. Despite 
disagreements over magnitude, it is clear that a devalued RMB benefits domestic Chinese 
firms at the expense of U.S. firms, as evidenced by the large trade deficit. Also, firms that 
compete with Chinese imports are competing on an unfair playing field. Since Chinese 
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exports have an implicit subsidy, the Chinese are able to price their products lower than 
their U.S. competitors that must compete without a subsidy. As a result, prices are driven 
down and competing firms’ profits, investments, and market share are reduced.58  
Although exporters and import competing firms lose because of China’s exchange 
rate policy, U.S. consumers and certain producers gain. Consumers gain because cheaper 
imports drive down the cost of everyday goods, which thereby, increases purchasing 
power. Import-competing firms are also forced to lower prices to compete. A devalued 
RMB subsidizes consumption and a higher standard of living in the United States. Higher 
levels of consumption benefit service industries. For this reason, 78% of the United 
States is employed in the service sector.59 Also, certain producers that utilize raw 
materials and other inputs from China benefit from the lower cost of imports. Cheaper 
inputs decrease expenses, and therefore, increase profitability and investment. These 
gains are seen in high-end manufacturing that require large amounts of foreign inputs.  
A devalued RMB clearly pressures a compositional shift in U.S. economic 
production and consumption, but what is the net effect on the U.S. economy? Studies 
conducted by Yale University and the Congressional Budget Office appear to show only 
slight downsides in the short run and likely no net gain or loss in the long run. The study 
finds that nearly a third of increased imports from China over the last decade came at the 
expense of other foreign importers as opposed to domestic importers. Also, claims of 
unemployment tied to China’s policies have been exaggerated because no clear 
correlation exists between the current account deficit and unemployment. For example, in 
2006, the deficit reached 6% of GDP; however, unemployment was 4.6%. In 2009, the 
deficit fell to 3% of GDP, but unemployment rose to 9.3%. The study estimated a 25% 
increase in the value of the RMB would harm imports from China and benefit exports to 
China, but that those benefits would be offset by lower Chinese economic growth and 
lower demand for U.S. goods. Additionally, the cost of Chinese goods in the United 
States would increase, which thereby, undermines the purchasing power of U.S. 
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consumers. The net impact on the U.S. economy was estimated to be negative in the short 
run and resulted in a loss of nearly 60,000 U.S. jobs, which is less than 1% of U.S. 
employment.60 
China’s exchange rate policy also has several national implications regarding U.S. 
spending, debt, and interest rates. To maintain a devalued currency, the PBoC must 
purchase U.S. dollars and treasuries to reduce the international supply. As was explained 
earlier, this buying has resulted in massive holdings by China of U.S. dollars and 
securities, which currently stand at $1.6 trillion.61 High demand for U.S. treasuries has 
allowed interest rates to remain low. This easy money has allowed the United States to 
run a large and consistent budget deficit. The most recent fiscal year ending in September 
2013 showed a budget deficit of $680 billion, which is the lowest in four years. 
Washington has become largely dependent on deficit spending. Were China to move to a 
flexible exchange rate, it would no longer need to purchase high levels of U.S. debt, 
which would thereby, drive down supply and possibly the interest rates on treasury notes. 
It is important to note that the PRC currently only holds 8% of all outstanding treasuries. 
The majority, 69%, is held by Americans. A reduction in purchases overtime would 
likely benefit the U.S. economy, as a devalued dollar relative to the RMB would reduce 
the trade deficit. If, however, the PRC purchases of U.S. debt were to cease immediately, 
the United States would be forced to pay higher interest on new purchases of debt and 
would also likely be forced to cut domestic spending. This threat could be exacerbated by 
other countries subsequently reducing purchases of U.S. debt due to higher risk. A rapid 
revaluation of the RMB could harm the United States through higher interest rates, more 
expensive debt, and required spending cuts.62 
Given the high risks associated with rapid revaluation and the limited downsides 
of gradual revaluation, calls by public officials for faster revaluation may be misplaced. 
Certain sectors of the American economy have been harmed by China’s exchange rate 
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policy including low-end manufacturing and import-competing firms, but other sectors 
including consumers and high-end manufacturing actually benefit. Despite alarmist calls 
by many in the media, and even certain politicians, studies show that a revaluation of the 
RMB would only slightly help the United States on a net basis. A rapid revaluation, 
which may be brought about by countervailing tariffs, would likely only harm the U.S. 
economy as higher interest rates could make current spending levels unaffordable. This 
cause and effect relationship perhaps has made the treasury department and senior U.S. 
officials reluctant to label China publicly a currency manipulator.63 Gradual appreciation 
of the RMB is safer and more beneficial to the U.S. economy than a rapid revaluation. 
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IV. CHINA’S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
China’s exchange rate policy is a double-edged sword because it has contributed 
to significant growth in the past, but will likely hinder future economic development 
because future progress will likely depend on innovation and consumer-driven growth. 
China has benefitted from emulating the roadmaps of other successful developers. It 
adapted what was effective and even leapfrogged ineffective or obsolete steps. This 
investment driven catch up process becomes less successful as China catches up 
technologically to other advanced nations because the nature of economic development 
changes. The returns from state-driven investments diminish as high yielding investments 
become less apparent. Rich industrialized nations like the United States are driven largely 
by innovation and consumption. Beijing recognizes the need to rebalance its economic 
growth. Documents released by the PRC including its 12th FYP, the World Bank 
collaborative China 2030, and the 18th Congress’ 3rd Plenum Communiqué show a 
recognition in China for the need to reform current policies. Since 2004, the PRC has 
engaged in rebalancing to reform current policies, including exchange rate appreciation. 
The RMB has appreciated over 25% since 2005. Gradual appreciation will affect the 
artificial winners and losers of the current imbalanced economy. Despite progress toward 
appreciation, several challenges still exist, such as unemployment, politics, and timing. 
Until these problems are overcome, the PRC will face challenges to achieving its vision. 
China’s exchange rate policy will be crucial in making such a transition. This section 
outlines how China’s current policies are inhibiting the transition to a more market driven 
and innovative economy. 
A. VISION OF THE FUTURE 
Leaders in China envision an innovative, harmonious, and consumer driven future 
economy. Since 2004, the CCP has officially pursued economic rebalancing to achieve 
this vision. Their goals are outlined in official plans released every five years. In October 
2010, the CCP central committee agreed on its guiding principles for the next five years. 
This agreement, known as the 12th FYP, is very broad and contains 60 chapters on topics 
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ranging from environmental improvement to steady urban development. Economic goals 
include enhancing the service industry, creating a positive consumption environment, 
promoting small and medium enterprises, and fostering strategic industries. To meet 
these goals, increased spending on social safety nets will be pursued to increase 
household disposable income. It also committed to invest heavily into the strategic 
emerging industries of biotechnology, new energy, high-end equipment manufacturing, 
energy conservation, and environmental protection, clean energy vehicles, new materials, 
health care, and next generation information technology. The government also intends to 
invest four trillion dollars to bring these industries to 20% of GDP by 2020.64  
Another important document, China 2030, was published in early 2013. This 
report is based off research conducted by China’s Ministry of Finance (MOF), The 
Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), and the World Bank. This 
report proposes six strategic directions for China to develop into a modern, harmonious, 
and creative society by 2030. By “consolidating market foundations; promoting green 
development; ensuring equality of opportunity and social protection for all; strengthening 
public finances; and achieving mutually beneficial win-win relations with the rest of the 
world,”65 the PRC hopes to move from a low-income country to a high-income country, 
which will require a transition from investment-driven growth to consumption-driven 
growth.  
In November 2013, the CPC 18th Central Committee released a communiqué on 
reforms agreed upon during the Third Plenum. The most recent communiqué, which 
includes 60 areas of reform, reiterates many goals stated in the 12th FYP and China 
2030. It also expounds upon the importance of perfecting the modern market system to 
ensure more efficient and fair allocation of resources. Also, non-public (service) sector 
growth is mentioned. Expanding the non-public sector will “promote innovation, expand 
employment, and increase tax revenues.”66 The Third Plenum Communiqué also 
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addresses capital controls, advocating the opening of the financial industry, marketizing 
interest rates, improving Treasury bond yields, and allowing private small and medium 
sized banks. The 3rd Plenum Communiqué is the most recent iteration of China’s vision 
of a modern, balanced, innovative, market-based, and consumer driven economy.67 
The scope of reforms needed to achieve the totality of China’s goals goes well 
beyond exchange rate policy. Numerous other policies including reforming SOEs, 
enforcing intellectual property rights, expanding free trade zones, and bridging the urban-
rural divide will also be necessary to achieve the PRC’s vision. A devalued currency; 
however, is inhibiting the necessary steps to achieve the vision of a modern, innovative, 
consumer-driven economy. 
B. A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
China’s exchange rate policy is preventing consumer-driven growth and 
innovation by enabling financial repression, inhibiting efficient capital allocation, 
facilitating imbalanced growth, undermining consumption, and creating friction in the 
international community. Reforms toward a more flexible exchange rate will better allow 
China to achieve its goals outlined above.  
Financial repression refers to the steps taken by the PBoC to maintain a devalued 
RMB while simultaneously preventing domestic inflation. This process, as was discussed 
in Chapter II, involves purchasing foreign reserves and selling domestic currency. At the 
same time, the central bank sterilizes the domestic currency by forcing government 
controlled banks to maintain high reserves and provide low interest on savings. This 
process has allowed the PRC to invest cheaply in SOEs and other industrial sectors. 
Financial repression resulting from a managed exchange rate policy essentially acts as a 
subsidy to industry, but is a tax on savers. Although this process has facilitated past 
growth by providing a subsidy to exports and allowing the government to invest cheaply, 
it has come at the expense of consumption. The wealth transfer from savers to industry 
was a major factor in China’s imbalanced growth. A higher interest rate on savings will 
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enhance the wealth of Chinese citizens. Halting financial repression by establishing a 
flexible exchange rate will allow China to move to consumption driven growth by 
increasing the wealth of the consumers.68 
Another form of financial repression is seen in capital controls. Since market 
forces are pushing the RMB higher, foreign investors are incentivized to purchase RMB 
in expectation of a future appreciation. A rapid inflow of capital or “hot money”69 could 
reduce the supply of RMB and cause uncontrollable inflation; therefore, the buying and 
selling of RMB is highly restricted. Although government-controlled sovereign wealth 
funds invest abroad, the average citizen has no such option. Incoming FDI has been a 
major driver of economic growth, but a lack of outward FDI prevents citizens from 
accessing greater wealth generating investments, such as higher yielding foreign bank 
accounts and stock exchanges. This lack of access further undermines consumer wealth 
and inhibits consumer driven growth.  
Imbalanced growth is preventing development in services and strategic industries 
outlined in the 12th FYP, particularly in high-end equipment manufacturing, clean energy 
vehicles, and health care. China’s exchange rate policy has benefitted exporters at the 
expense of importers and the service sector. High-end manufacturing requires numerous 
inputs, often times from overseas. The implicit tariff caused by an undervalued RMB 
makes these inputs more expensive, and therefore, the final product is more expensive. 
The same is true for clean energy vehicles. A more flexible exchange rate policy would 
also benefit these strategic sectors by increasing the purchasing power of consumers. 
Reduction in the implicit tariff on imports and an increase in savings would allow 
hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens to allocate capital better. Gains from greater 
purchasing power would likely enhance health care, which is an area of priority for most 
consumers. Direct government investment in these industries, as is currently planned, will 
certainly benefit growth, but sustained growth will require greater consumption power 
derived from a flexible exchange rate. 
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Another goal stated in the China 2030 was mutually beneficial relations with the 
rest of the world. China’s exchange rate policy and associated foreign reserve buildup has 
become a source of international friction. It was argued in the previous chapter that 
China’s holding of U.S. foreign reserves allows for low interest rates on treasuries and 
actually benefits certain sectors, such as high-end manufacturing and consumption. Even 
though the PRC’s holding of U.S. debt may be beneficial, many are concerned and upset 
by a perceived unfair trading practice. The U.S. Department of the Treasury released its 
semi-annual report on foreign exchanges on October 30 of this year, and stated, “China 
has resumed large-scale purchases of foreign reserves this year, despite having 
accumulated 3.6 trillion in reserves, which are more than sufficient by any measure, is 
suggestive of actions that are impeding market determination and a currency that is 
significantly undervalued.”70 Many argue that China’s holdings give them political and 
economic leverage over the United States. Others, however, counter that China has no 
leverage because it is equally reliant on U.S. debt, “when the United States owes China 
tens of billions, that is America’s problem, but when it owes trillions, that is China’s 
problem.”71 Whether or not this debt is an immediate threat is up for discussion, but few 
disagree that increasing debt overtime creates a strategic vulnerability and harms certain 
sectors of the U.S. economy. As a result, outcries for U.S. action against China have 
broad support. Both sides of the political spectrum have advocated legislation labeling 
China a currency manipulator. Divergent groups, such as labor unions and business 
owners, deride China’s exchange rate policy. Whether or not these complaints have merit 
does not change the fact that China’s current policy is creating international tension. A 
more flexible exchange rate would better allow China to achieve its goal of mutually 
beneficial international relations. 
The most important aspect of moving to a consumer-driven growth model is a 
market-based allocation of resources, which was a goal of the Third Plenum 
Communiqué. The PRC’s exchange rate policy undermines consumer wealth that is 
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necessary for the efficient allocation of resources. Often times government spending is 
directed at creating short-term growth or maintaining employment as opposed to filling 
an actual economic demand. An example is the 2008 stimulus given to local governments 
that have funded unfilled malls and real estate buildings. Without a market demand, or 
customers, these projects will not generate revenue. Government spending will then be 
required to maintain these projects and businesses. Such an example of poor allocation of 
resources is China’s SOEs in which an estimated one in four is losing money.72 
Overtime, this process moves money from productive sectors of society to unproductive 
sectors of society. This movement results in unsustainable growth and increased debt. 
Consumption has lagged the combination of government investment and trade surplus in 
China’s economic growth, and policies directed at stimulating investment are harming 
consumption. As time goes on, government investments will become less profitable and 
exporters will find greater competition from lower-wage competition. A domestic market 
is needed to generate demand signals. Greater wealth in the hands of millions of 
consumers will more appropriately allocate the nation’s resources and drive future 
growth and innovation.73 
A flexible exchange will contribute to the PRC’s goals of enhancing services, 
growing small and medium enterprises, and fostering innovation. Much of the low 
hanging fruit of high-yielding investments has been picked in China. Future growth will 
require investment in more dispersed opportunities. Services have not received the 
attention from government investment in the past because they are not as visible and the 
gains are often times dispersed. To fund service opportunities, capital must also be 
dispersed. Hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens with greater purchasing power will 
better allocate investment and resources toward the services necessary to grow the 
economy. More dispersed wealth will also provide greater investment opportunities to 
small and medium enterprises. Additionally, greater consumer wealth will provide more 
customers to these firms that otherwise would not have the money. Lastly, more 
dispersed capital will also allow for greater specialization. As economic supply catches 
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up with economic demand, small and medium enterprises will be able to fill new markets 
niches and specialize, which will drive innovation. Poor capital allocation harms 
innovation, services, and small enterprises. A market priced RMB would help China 
achieve its goals by facilitating market-based allocation resources.  
C. GRADUAL REFORM IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
A snapshot in time may show China’s exchange rate policy to be a major 
hindrance to further economic growth. It is important, however, to note that China has 
been gradually appreciating the RMB in line with macro-economic and international 
pressures for nearly a decade, with a brief intermission after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Since 2005, the RMB has appreciated over 26%, and official documents from leadership 
advocate continued exchange rate flexibility. This appreciation can be used to test 
expectations of increased exchange rate flexibility. Based off the above analysis, a 
stronger RMB would be expected to create increased household consumption and 
services as a percent of GDP. A reduction in industry and net exports is expected as well. 
A stronger RMB would also correlate with a reduced rate of foreign exchange reserves 
and trade surplus.  
 
Figure 6.  Impacts of RMB Appreciation on Consumption and Production Since 200574 
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A side-by-side comparison of national consumption and production relative to 
exchange rate appreciation shows several trends. An analysis of national consumption 
since 2005 shows a slight decrease in industry and agriculture as a percent of GDP. 
Conversely, services have offset this decrease and risen as a percentage of GDP. This 
trend is in line with what is expected. As industry became less profitable, greater 
investment would move toward services. The impact of RMB appreciation on production 
is less pronounced. Consumption from both households and government appears to 
remain relatively stable whereas net exports slightly decreased and investments slightly 
increased. It would be expected that an appreciation in the RMB would result in an 
increase in household consumption as consumers accumulated greater purchasing power. 
It is important to note that although the RMB has appreciated, the associated policies of 
financial repression and capital controls are still in place. These policies still undermine 
consumer purchasing power.  
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Figure 7.  Effects of RMB Appreciation on China’s Foreign Exchange Holdings75 
A decrease in purchases of U.S. dollars is expected as well. Since China no longer 
needs to purchase as many dollars to keep a devalued currency, the holdings of foreign 
reserves would be expected to increase at a lower rate or even decrease. The above chart 
appears to confirm this prediction. The composition of China’s foreign holdings is not 
publically accessible, but it is suspected to be comprised mostly of the U.S. dollar. In 
2004, foreign reserves increased 28%, but between 2011 and 2012, reserves increased 
only 4%. Also, China’s holdings of U.S. securities actually decreased.  
An analysis of RMB appreciation since 2005 may be too short to determine 
definitively the real extent of exchange rate policy on economic rebalancing. Also, 
numerous other international factors affect economic growth. The financial crisis of 
2008, for example, likely played a role in reducing exports. Many of China’s trading 
partners have also engaged in currency devaluation including Japan and the United 
States. The devaluation of a trading partner’s currency would also affect the trade 
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imbalance, which may also be a factor in decreasing reserves. China is likely to reduce 
purchases of the U.S. dollar if it suspects the dollar is going to decline in value. Although 
it is difficult to parse out the individual impacts of an increasing RMB in the context of 
numerous global factors, careful comparison overtime will help determine the impact of 
RMB appreciation. 
D. CHALLENGES OF GRADUAL APPRECIATION 
Although China has appreciated the RMB over the last decade, the rate of 
appreciation has been, and many in America argue, painfully slow. Slow reform is not 
new to China, as it took 15 years to meet the requirements of the WTO. Future progress 
will likely continue to be slow as numerous barriers to rapid appreciation must be 
carefully overcome. To continue progress toward a market-driven economy, many 
challenges will need to be overcome including unemployment, politics, and sequencing. 
Throughout the last decade, China has maintained that its currency policy reflects 
the desire to maintain stability as opposed to gaining an unfair trade advantage. This 
claim may contain a large degree of truth. China currently has a labor force of over 
750 million workers, which accounts for 26% of the world’s total workforce. Despite 
miraculous growth in GDP over the past decade, Beijing is still struggling to keep up 
with the growing number of Chinese looking for employment. Experts estimate that 
China has between 17 and 45 million unemployed as of 2009. The unemployment 
dynamic is different for the CCP than it is for leaders in the United States. The CCP relies 
on economic growth and high levels of employment for legitimacy to remain in power. 
Without continued success on these fronts, China may face domestic upheavals, and 
possibly, a regime change. In the past, China’s growth has been driven by manufacturing 
and exports. A devalued RMB has benefitted these sectors by making exports cheaper 
compared to countries with stronger currencies. The CCP realizes, however, that this 
growth is coming at the expense of the service sector, which tends to be more labor 
intensive. China’s slow rate of currency appreciation may be a reflection of the CCP’s 
attempts to shift to a service driven economy without triggering an economic slowdown 
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or high levels of unemployment. A rapid rate of appreciation may be seen as a threat to 
domestic political stability.76 
Another barrier to rapid change is politics. Financial repression and imbalanced 
growth have created vested interests in the current system. Many officials maintain power 
and prestige by controlling resource and credit allocation. Businesses in the sectors of the 
economy that benefit from imbalanced growth receive subsidies and increased profit. 
These subsidies along with regulation act as a barrier to entry for competition. Reform is 
a threat to those who benefit from the current investments. Despite the economic need to 
change, mobilized special interests will oppose a more flexible exchange rate.77  
Proper sequencing and timing is another challenge to reform. China’s exchange 
rate policy is intricately linked to complimentary policies like capital controls and interest 
rates. Any reform will require careful timing to mitigate the harmful effects of one policy 
change on another. Reform must be comprehensive as opposed to piecemeal. Although a 
detailed roadmap is impossible to create due to unpredictable economic developments, a 
broad sequencing scheme can provide guidance. The first step would be gradual 
appreciation of the RMB to market levels. To prevent large capital flows, capital controls 
must still be utilized, particularly on capital inflows. Next, the PBoC must be granted 
more independence, and allowed to pursue anti-inflationary monetary policy; moreover, 
it would be able to move away from artificial administrative controls on inflation. 
Concurrently, financial regulation must be established to enhance financial and banking 
markets. Regulation in a broad sense refers to laws that reduce barriers to information 
and enforcement, but also allow a level of governmental direction. Strong financial 
markets will allow for the liberalization of deposit interest rates, which must be done in 
stages to prevent excessive credit expansion. Control of lending rates must also be done 
gradually to prevent excessive capital flows from banks to non-banking financial 
institutions. Further currency stability would be encouraged by greater use of the RMB to 
settle current account transactions. Greater use of the RMB as an international currency 
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allows for greater effectiveness of monetary policy. Lastly, the process for approval of 
inward and outward FDI should be abolished. Outward FDI would allow citizens greater 
access to foreign financial institutions and reduce upward pressure on exchange rates. 
Restrictions on short-term inward FDI should be removed last to lessen the impact of an 
influx of hot money. This approach entails risk, as there are many moving parts. To 
mitigate this risk, reform and transitioning should be stretched out over many years with 
constant reassessment and changes as necessary. Like past reforms, exchange rate policy 
reform will require crossing the river by feeling for stones.78 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The research question underlying this thesis sought to determine how currency 
devaluation has impacted China’s goals of rebalancing toward a consumption driven 
economy. It also sought to examine the winners and losers of currency devaluation within 
the Chinese economy, as well as determine implications for the American economy. This 
thesis argues that currency devaluation was beneficial to economic growth in the past, but 
will be an impediment to future growth because the devalued RMB contributes to an 
incentive structure that results in a misallocation of resources, and therefore, imbalanced 
growth. This unequal growth has benefitted certain sectors of the economy including 
exporters, particularly low-end manufacturing, and import competing businesses. Other 
sectors, including importers, high-end manufacturing, consumers, savers, and the services 
sector have been harmed by currency devaluation. To transition to consumer driven 
growth, consumers need resources. Since the current system undermines consumer 
purchasing power through lower savings and higher prices for tradable goods, consumer 
driven growth has been impeded. Also, high-end manufacturing that requires multiple 
inputs, are relatively more costly due to the implicit tariff on imports. This situation 
undermines many of the strategic industries China intends to pursue. 
A. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
China’s exchange rate policy exists in a global structure with no overarching rule 
set. After the United States abandoned the gold standard in the 1970s, countries have had 
the freedom to pursue a fixed, floating, or managed exchange rate policy according to 
their economic interests. China, for over a decade, has pursued a managed or crawling 
peg, whereby, it has pegged its currency to the U.S. dollar at an artificially low rate, but 
have allowed it to slowly appreciate. The process of maintaining this policy is complex 
and affects other aspects of the financial sector. China’s central bank, the PBPC, executes 
the PRC’s monetary policy. The PBoC maintains a devalued RMB by selling domestic 
currency and buying U.S. dollars, which results in enormous foreign reserves that alters 
the supply and demand of the currencies, which drives the U.S. dollar up, but the RMB 
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down. To prevent domestic inflation, the central bank must direct state controlled 
commercial banks to maintain high reserves and pay low interest rates. This process 
limits the supply of the domestic RMB and controls inflation, but it forces savers to 
accept low interest rates on savings. Also, to prevent foreign investors from buying RMB 
in anticipation of appreciation, capital controls are placed on the RMB. Access to China’s 
currency is limited, which prevents it from becoming utilized as an international 
currency. China’s policy of maintaining a crawling peg has allowed it to maintain a 
devalued RMB, but it has also harmed savers, increased reserves, and limited investment. 
The above process shows the interconnectedness of policies related to exchange 
rates. The PRC, to maintain a devalued currency, must also engage in financial repression 
and capital controls. These two related policies contribute in many ways to undermine 
consumer driven growth. The financial repression of lower interest rates placed on 
savings has acted as a mechanism for wealth transfer from savers to government 
investment. The low rates allow the PRC to borrow money cheaply and keep inflation 
low, but it robs millions of Chinese citizens from interest income. Also, capital controls 
exacerbate the situation by eliminating alternative investment opportunities for Chinese 
citizens abroad. A devalued RMB undermines consumer wealth by increasing the price of 
imports, which undercuts competition and raises prices. Moreover, the associated policies 
of financial repression and capital controls further undermine consumer wealth. 
China’s exchange rate policy has been a cornerstone of its investment driven 
economy. The PRC has directed capital investments into infrastructure, industry, and 
SOEs. A devalued currency enables this process in two ways. First, exports were 
relatively cheaper in international trade, which brought in large amounts of FDI and tax 
revenue. Second, lowered interest rates allowed the PRC to borrow at low cost. Savers 
involuntarily subsidized government investments. This model has turned China into a 
manufacturing powerhouse. In 2010, the PRC overtook the United States as the world’s 
largest manufacturing economy. Despite past successes, the investment driven model 
appears to have reached a point of diminishing returns. Government investments are 
becoming increasingly less profitable. Also, government investment has created artificial 
imbalances in its economy that will be necessary to overcome to continue steady growth. 
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B. IMBALANCED GROWTH 
The investment driven growth model that turned China into a manufacturing 
powerhouse has also created economic imbalances. Two approaches to measuring this 
imbalance look at economic production and economic expenditures. The expenditure 
approach looks at how the nation’s resources are spent through private consumption, 
governmental consumption, investment, and net exports. Over the past decade, the 
expenditure approach shows increases in investment and net exports, but a decrease in 
consumption. This imbalance contrasts other developing and developed countries, such as 
like India and the United States, in which consumption is the leading factor of growth. A 
devalued RMB contributes to this phenomenon by increasing competitiveness of exports 
relative to competitors. Also, more expensive imports and low savings returns 
undermines the wealth of private citizens, which reduces private consumption. The 
production approach, which measures agriculture, industry, and services, also shows 
imbalances toward industry due in part to a devalued RMB that acted as a subsidy to 
exports and a tariff on imports. This incentive structure made exports, mainly 
manufacturing, more profitable. Since it was more profitable, it received greater 
investments. The opposite was true for services, which are driven more by consumers.  
These imbalances create artificial winners and losers. A devalued currency acts as 
a subsidy to exports and a tariff on imports. As a result, exports greatly benefit from this 
set up. Exports generate artificially high profits, which in turn, attract higher levels of 
investment. Simultaneously, import-competing businesses benefit because the implicit 
tariff makes imports more expensive. Domestic competitors can then raise their prices 
and generate higher profits. This process makes prices higher for the average Chinese 
citizen. The associated policies of financial repression and capital controls further 
undermine consumer purchasing power. Higher import prices also affect high-end 
manufacturing in products like vehicles, medical equipment, and sophisticated 
electronics. These products require large amounts of inputs, many of which are imported. 
Higher priced imports drive up the price of the finished good. This process makes it 
harder for high-end manufacturing to attract profits and investments. Lastly, the service 
sector is harmed by the current imbalance. Services tend to be overlooked by government 
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investment because their demand is often dispersed. Greater purchasing power in the 
hands of millions of Chinese consumers would better fill the economic demand of the 
nation’s various services. 
China’s exchange rate policy also has a significant impact on the United States. 
Just as its policy creates artificial winners and losers in the Chinese economy, it also 
creates artificial winners and loser in the U.S. economy. One of the losers is exporters, 
especially those who export to China. A devalued RMB acts as a tariff on imports; 
therefore, goods shipped to China will be less profitable. Also, many of these firms 
compete unsuccessfully with cheap Chinese exports in other foreign countries. Firms that 
compete with Chinese imports also lose. The implicit subsidy to exports allows firms to 
lower their prices without cutting into their profit margin. By contrast, U.S. firms 
competing with these products must lower prices and lose profitability. This process 
lowers prices that benefit U.S. consumers. The American people have benefitted from 
low cost goods because of China’s devalued RMB. Also, high-end manufacturing 
capable of buying cheap inputs are able to sell their products at an increased profit. 
Although the net gain or loss to the U.S. economy is still a matter of debate, it is clear 
that China’s exchange rate policy has an unequal impact on the U.S. economy. 
C. CHINA’S DOUBLE EDGED SWORD 
The PRC has stated through various government documents that it desires to 
rebalance its economy from an investment driven model to a consumption driven model. 
The investment driven model of the past was successful in achieving rapid growth and 
industrial capacity. However, much of the high yielding opportunities identified by the 
government investment have been utilized. Market-based allocation of resources through 
consumption will be needed for future sustained growth. China’s exchange rate policy is 
hindering this progress by enabling financial repression, inhibiting efficient capital 
allocation, facilitating imbalanced growth, undermining consumption, and creating 
friction in the international community. Financial repression, through low interest rates 
and capital controls, undermines consumer purchasing power, which is necessary for 
consumer driven growth. Also, consumers are better suited to fill the diverse economic 
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demands of a modern economy. Millions of Chinese with purchasing power will be able 
to distribute resources better to the areas of highest utility. A devalued RMB also 
facilitates imbalanced growth by creating an artificial incentive structure that favors 
industry and exporters at the expense of consumers, importers, and services. Lastly, 
China’s exchange rate policy has caused friction with trading partners. This friction may 
lead to countervailing tariffs, which would undermine the stable international 
environment necessary for economic growth. 
The PRC has been gradually appreciating the RMB since 2005, but challenges 
still exist in employment, politics, and sequencing that must be resolved prior to full 
exchange rate flexibility. Much of China’s workforce relies on manufacturing and export 
oriented jobs. A rapid appreciation of the RMB could cause an unemployment shock. 
Since the PRC relies on stability for political legitimacy, this option is unacceptable. 
Gradual RMB appreciation will allow jobs to shift from industry to services in a more 
stable fashion. Another issue is political opposition. Large government investments have 
created entrenched special interests over the years. These groups will oppose action that 
undermines their narrow objectives, regardless of what is best for the economy. Also, 
reform will require careful timing and sequencing. Releasing capital controls before 
achieving RMB equilibrium could cause rapid appreciation and economic instability. The 
PRC must follow a gradual sequenced approach to avoid instability. 
D. DISCUSSION 
A major focus of the literature on exchange rates focuses on whether or not 
currency manipulation is expansionary or contractionary. A survey of numerous studies 
provided conflicting evidence, which led the authors to conclude that the effects of 
currency devaluation are country specific.79 In the case of China, it would appear that 
devaluation was expansionary initially. A devalued currency attracted FDI and 
contributed to industrial capacity. Overtime, however, it appears that a devalued RMB 
will become contractionary. Once the industrial capacity is established, further growth 
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requires innovation and consumption, which was established previously, is hindered by a 
devalued currency. Additional studies should focus not merely on GDP growth before 
and after the implementation of currency devaluation, but should focus on where the 
particular country is in development. Countries without an industrial capacity may benefit 
from currency manipulation, whereas countries with an industrial capacity may be 
harmed. Further research should focus more on a nation’s level of development. 
Along those same lines, this thesis neither confirms nor repudiates the economic 
theories of liberalism or mercantilism. Government intervention appears to have greatly 
benefitted China’s development up to this point. Friedrich List’s argument that the 
government should intervene in industry appears to hold true in the case of China. 
Government directed investments and a devalued RMB has turned China from an 
agricultural society into the world’s factory. Conversely, liberalism could also argue that 
this process has led to imbalanced growth, which is unsustainable. Whether or not China 
is able to transition to a flexible exchange rate policy without instability or a major 
economic downturn has theoretical implications. A smooth transition will give credibility 
to government intervention in economic development, but a large economic downturn 
would vindicate the liberalist argument that government intervention should remain 
minimal. 
An issue of concern raised by this thesis is the level of political animus directed at 
the PRC’s exchange rate policy. Public consensus appears to be largely against China’s 
current policy of gradual appreciation. Many lawmakers have unsuccessfully pushed laws 
that would establish countervailing tariffs on China’s imports. This outlook appears to 
overstate the harm done to the United States and also underestimates the harm that could 
be done by rapid appreciation of the RMB. A rapid increase in RMB would harm several 
sectors of the economy including consumers and high-end manufacturing. Also, it cannot 
be guaranteed that jobs lost to China would come back to the United States. A rapid 
increase would also mean that the PRC would no longer need to purchase U.S. treasuries. 
Since China is the largest purchases of U.S. debt, a sudden stop in purchases without the 
entrance of a new purchaser could raise interest rates on U.S. debt. America’s large 
budget deficit and debt level are not currently in the best position to handle a rate 
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increase. It is currently in America’s best interest to support a smooth gradual 
appreciation of the RMB as opposed to a rapid increase brought on by countervailing 
tariffs. 
This hypothesis of this research was that China’s exchange rate policy does not 
have a net benefit to economic progress, but rather benefits certain sectors of the 
economy at the expense of others. The research finds this hypothesis party correct, but 
the reality is more nuanced. China’s exchange rate policy has had a net benefit to 
economic growth in the past by building a manufacturing base, infrastructure, and 
attracting FDI. A devalued currency is only a part of China’s investment driven growth 
model. To maintain a devalued currency, other policies like low interest rates on savings 
and capital controls are required. The plurality of the related policies along with a 
devalued currency has contributed to imbalanced growth. To maintain future economic 
progress, the RMB will need to be gradually and systematically appreciated. 
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